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THE JOSE PADILLA HABEAS CASE: A MODERN
DAY STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE THE
GREAT WRIT
Donna Newman*
Thank you very much for having me here today.  The real
fight, the heart of the fight in the Jose Padilla case1 was a fight
against the administration’s attempt to diminish the great writ—
the writ of habeas corpus.  It was a fight to establish that no one,
not even the President, is above the law—that not even the Presi-
dent can detain an American citizen indefinitely without bringing
a charge.
Mr. Padilla, as many of you may know from the news, is cur-
rently standing trial in Florida.2  That is a criminal trial.  That case
has nothing directly to do with the case in which I represented Mr.
Padilla, although the prosecution was the remedy I sought.  I rep-
resented Mr. Padilla in his habeas corpus petition against the gov-
ernment in which we asserted that Mr. Padilla was being held
contrary to his constitutional rights because he was being detained
without being charged with a crime.  We therefore sought either
his release or his being charged with a crime for which he would
have the opportunity to stand trial.
In May 2002, Mr. Padilla was arrested at Chicago Airport on a
material witness warrant3 issued from the Southern District of New
York demanding his appearance and testimony before the grand
jury sitting within that district.  I was appointed by a judge sitting in
the Southern District to represent Mr. Padilla.
* Opened her own practice in 1991 and maintains offices in New York and New
Jersey.  She predominately practices in federal court, specializing in representing
criminal defendants before district courts and courts of appeals. She has represented
over 500 clients in matters ranging from simple fraud to complex security fraud and
racketeering cases.
1 Jose Padilla, one of the first Americans seized on U.S. soil designated an “enemy
combatant,” was accused of planning to detonate a radioactive “dirty bomb.” Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004) (denying petition for habeas corpus based on
jurisdictional grounds); see Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane, Padilla Is Guilty on All
Charges in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at A1 (commenting on how trial
charges were not related to allegations that Padilla was planning to detonate a “dirty
bomb”).
2 United States v. Hassoun, No. 04-6001 (S.D. Fla Aug. 16, 2007), available at http/
fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/padilla/uspad81707juryverdict1.gif
(noting a jury conviction for criminal terrorism related charges).
3 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
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A material witness is an individual whom the government be-
lieves has information about an investigation and the government
issues the warrant to compel the witness’ testimony and to keep the
individual in jail until he testifies before the grand jury.4  However,
about a month after his arrest as a material witness, the govern-
ment became frustrated with the process and decided to take a
more radical step to assure their receipt of information from Mr.
Padilla.
On June 9, 2002, President Bush declared Mr. Padilla to be an
“enemy combatant.”  The government used that designation to cir-
cumvent the grand jury process, in fact all process, in fact the Con-
stitution.  Rather then charge Mr. Padilla with a crime which would
mean certain Constitutional rights would kick-in, such as the right
to have a grand jury pass on an indictment, the right to a speedy
trial, etc., the government asserted that by declaring Mr. Padilla an
enemy combatant, he had no rights.  In short, they claimed, the
military had a right to detain Padilla indefinitely, not charge him
with a crime, interrogate him, deprive him of access to counsel,
and to keep him in solitary confinement.  And that is exactly what
they did from June 2002 until April 2004.
Their legal analysis was flawed.  They distorted international
law, they distorted American case law from World War II and the
very term “enemy combatant” was invented.5  In any event, the
term was misapplied to the Padilla situation.
I began by saying the Padilla case was about the great writ be-
cause it was a case in which we questioned the President’s authority
to detain an American citizen seized on American soil indefinitely
without a charge. History, as you know, repeats itself.
In 1627 Charles I imprisoned five knights,6 one of whom was
Sir Thomas Darnel.7  The knights’ offense was their refusal to pay
4 Id.
5 DEPUTY SEC’Y OF DEF. DEP’T OF DEF. COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL PRO-
CESS 1 (2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mul/news/Aug2006/d20060809
CSRTProcedures.pdf. The Department of Defense defines an enemy combatant as:
[A]n individual who was part of our supporting Tailban or al Qaida
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has
committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of
enemy armed forces.
Id.
6 See J.S. Guy, The Origins of the Petition of Right Reconsidered, 25 HIST. J. 289, 291
(1982) (Hereinafter The Origins of the Petition); see generally J.H. Baker, 6 THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 94 (2003).
7 Id.
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the taxes the King imposed to finance his war.  Sir Darnel and his
cohorts refused to pay the tax to voice opposition to the King’s war
against France and Spain.8  The King, clearly unhappy with this
demonstration of opposition, claimed a right by “my special com-
mand,”  “as a matter of state,” to imprison the knights without
charging them with an offense.9  The Attorney General provided
the legal basis (sound familiar?) and emphasized that the Crown
had an overriding interest in protecting the people from a conspir-
acy that threatened the common good.10  Therefore, he claimed
he was within his right to imprison these knights.  No judge, not
even Parliament, he claimed, could intervene with the Crown’s ac-
tions.11  Eventually, the King released the knights.  Parliament,
however, did not let things rest (I guess Parliament was more out-
raged at the treatment of their citizens than Congress today).  They
passed the Petition of Rights, which prohibited the arrest and de-
tention of somebody without a charge because such an action vio-
lated the very essential right of due process that was guaranteed by
the Magna Carta.12  The essentials of the Petition of Rights were
codified a half a century later in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,
which guaranteed the right to contest detention by a sovereign.13
The Founding Fathers were keenly aware of the dangers inher-
ent in sovereign/executive power and sought to guard against it.
Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers No. 84, that the
most “dangerous engine of arbitrary government” is “confinement
of the person by secretly hurrying him to jail where his sufferings
are unknown or forgotten.”14  Therefore, the Founding Fathers
specifically limited the Executive’s power and in particular in-
cluded in the Constitution itself in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2,
“the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in . . . Cases of . . . Invasion the public safety may
8 Id.
9 Darnel’s Case, 3 HOW. ST. TR. 1, 37 (K.B. 1627) (argument of Attorney General
Robert Heath).
10 Id. at 45; King Charles I argued that detention without filing charges was legal
“by his majesty’s special commandment.” See The Origins of the Petition, at 291–93; see
also, Robert S. Walker, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY 67 (1960); Mark Kishlansky, Tyranny Denied: Charles I,
Attorney General Heath, and the Five Knights Case, 42 HIST. J, 53, 60 (1999).
11 Id.
12 See The Constitution Society, Records Concerning Parliament, http://www.con-
stitution.org/sech/sech_092.htm  (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
13 See Id. Habeas Corpus Act, http://www.constitution.org/eng/habcorpa.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
14 The Federalist No. 84, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (Beloff ed. 1987) (quoting
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136).
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require it.”15  This occurs only when martial law has been declared.
Congress, under a plain reading of the Constitution, I suggest, is
the only body which can suspend the great writ.
In the Padilla case, the government never admitted to sus-
pending the writ, but their actions speak louder than their denials.
What they did was tantamount to suspending the writ as to him.
They held Padilla without a charge and said they could hold him at
their discretion without a charge.  They said he could contest the
detention—i.e. file a writ—but of course he was being held incom-
municado which made it for all practical purposes impossible for
him to file his writ.  On top of that, they said his attorney could
prosecute his habeas writ but denied him access to the attorney
who was representing him.  As a final effort to effectively deny him
the power to prosecute the writ, they argued that I could not bring
the writ on his behalf and insisted this man being held incommuni-
cado, whom I could not see, must sign the writ himself.  In short,
they attempted to diminish, dilute and effectively eliminate Pa-
dilla’s right to habeas corpus.  At the bottom of their argument,
similar to King Charles I, the government claimed they need not
answer to anyone.
The Supreme Court disagreed.  As then-Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld stated:
As critical as the government’s interests may be in detaining
those who actually pose an imminent threat to national security,
history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of
detention carries the potential to become a means of oppression
and abuse . . . . We reaffirm today the fundamental nature of an
[American] citizen’s right to be free from involuntary confine-
ment by his own government without due process of law.16
The government, as I stated before, finally had to relent.  They
charged Mr. Padilla with a crime and, as I mentioned before, Mr.
Padilla is now on trial in Florida on the charges they brought to
trial.17  It is important to recognize that before this occurred,  Pa-
dilla had to fight for a right which was long established: his right to
habeas corpus.  It is indeed a chilling thought to envision what
would have happened to Padilla had he not been first arrested as a
material witness and counsel assigned.  Would he have been taken
by the military, held incommunicado, and subject to horrific inter-
15 U.S. CONST. art. 1 §9, cl.2.
16 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 350–51 (2004).
17 Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane, Padilla Is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at A1.
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rogation without the ability to assert his right to habeas relief?  In
short, we have no guarantee that this chilling vision cannot be real-
ity.  I leave you with that vision to spur vigilance of this most impor-
tant writ, which was established to safeguard against executives who
act outside the law.

